Practical PhilosophyChapter 1

The Life You Did Not Choose

By the time a person can sign a record of a life, almost every field above the signature has already been filled.

1.1 Before the First Choice

At the bottom of a form is a blank line marked Signature. Above it are a legal name, date and place of birth, citizenship, first language, address, emergency contact, and perhaps family medical history. The page calls this personal information. Yet almost none of it began as a personal decision. The name was selected by someone else. The date arrived without consultation. The place depended on movements, borders, permissions, accidents, and histories already in progress. Even the language in which the form is understood arrived before the signer could compare it with another.

The signature is being made now; the record is mostly older than the act that confirms it. That is not merely an administrative curiosity. It exposes the first difficulty of a life: something can be genuinely mine without having originated in me.

Civilization has good reasons for building records this way. A birth certificate lets an event outlive its witnesses; a name distinguishes one person across institutions; a medical history can make risk visible before the body announces it. Human beings have built remarkable ways for absent facts and earlier events to remain operational in the present.

The achievement has a cost of compression. “Place of birth” does not show why a household was there, whether arrival was planned or forced, which border had been crossed, or which authority recognized the record. “Emergency contact” says nothing about whether care is reliable, strained, distant, or unavailable. “First language” does not show which words belonged only to grandparents or which language later became necessary to leave home. The form preserves what institutions need to know by leaving much of the life out.

The same compression begins before paperwork. Adults may call a child calm, difficult, shy, bright, or responsible before the child can examine the description. It may notice something real while altering what is watched for, forgiven, demanded, and expected. The word is not destiny. It becomes part of the field in which later conduct is interpreted.

Historical timing is equally unchosen. A person can be born into peace or war, expansion or decline, political openness or repression, technological stability or disruption. One generation’s event becomes another’s ordinary environment through borders, institutions, opportunities, absences, fears, and family instructions.

This is what given will mean in this chapter. A condition is given when it is already present by the time the relevant person can respond to it. Given does not mean good, fair, natural, permanent, or worthy of gratitude. It describes the relation of a condition to choice: the condition is already there when choosing begins.

Two seductive errors appear immediately. Fatalism mistakes an inherited beginning for a completed verdict. The opposite fantasy imagines that freedom becomes real only after inheritance has been shed, as though received language, history, or dependence disqualified a life from becoming one’s own.

The errors look opposed, but both place freedom outside the actual life. Fatalism says the inherited field leaves no meaningful response. Complete self-authorship says a response counts as free only if the field was privately authored. Neither describes choosing, which occurs with formed capacities among alternatives made more or less reachable by existing conditions.

Even rebellion depends on this inheritance. To reject a family expectation, a social classification, or a political rule, a person must first be able to recognize it, name it, compare it with another possibility, and reach some practical space in which refusal can matter. Choice does not arrive before the inherited world. It appears inside it.

The form therefore does not record a preliminary life that must be escaped before the real one begins. It records the materials from which the real problem of freedom emerges. And before language, institutions, or historical interpretation can claim those materials, one condition has already set the terms of every encounter with them: the body through which the life is lived.

1.2 The Body One Receives

The body does not wait for a theory of the self before exerting authority. Hunger interrupts. Light hurts or helps. Balance fails. Pain narrows attention. Warmth permits rest. Fatigue ends arguments that abstract conviction intended to continue. Long before a person can say “my body,” bodily conditions have already divided the world into what can be reached, endured, noticed, enjoyed, feared, and survived.

Calling the body an instrument misses this priority. An instrument can normally be put down while the user remains. The body is the condition through which putting down, choosing, speaking, remembering, touching, and moving are possible at all. It brings capability and limit together: perception, movement, pleasure, dexterity, memory, sexuality, endurance, vulnerability, and dependence appear through a living form that changes with time.

That changing form gives time much of its practical weight. A deadline meets a body that needs sleep, recovers from illness, ages, becomes pregnant, is injured, or simply reaches the end of concentration. A schedule can be formally identical and bodily unequal. The same hour asks different things of a rested person and someone carrying pain or a sleepless night.

Dependence is therefore not an unfortunate exception added to an otherwise self-contained life. Every human life begins radically dependent on food, warmth, protection, regulation, movement, language, and care. Adult competence can hide dependence inside wages, appliances, infrastructure, public services, relationships, and routines, but it does not remove it.

Bodies differ, and environments meet those differences unevenly. A crowded room can energize one person and overwhelm another. Differences in vision, hearing, mobility, endurance, pain, cognition, and sensory response alter the practical world an environment presents. They do not rank human worth; they change the conditions of participation.

The same staircase can be a route, an ordeal, or no route at all.

Once that is visible, a bodily limit and an environmental barrier can no longer be cleanly separated. A person whose mobility changes may be able to cross a room but not the building entrance. The body is real; so is the doorway. Neither description by itself explains the practical limit. Movement depends on the fit between a particular body and a material arrangement the person may not control.

Support can therefore enlarge rather than diminish personal action. A mobility aid, interpreter, medication, ride, adaptive interface, or another person’s assistance may make a choice possible that unaided capacity could not sustain. The assistance does not become the chooser simply because the chooser depends on it. The harder question is whether support preserves understanding, consent, participation, and dignity, or whether dependence becomes an excuse for someone else to claim authority over the life receiving help.

The body is also read by others. Age, movement, voice, clothing, disability, and signs of health are interpreted through categories that confer authority, suspicion, vulnerability, competence, or exclusion. The interpretation is not the body, yet its consequences can become bodily: care is offered or delayed, space granted or denied, danger believed or dismissed.

This makes embodiment neither fate nor raw material for unlimited redesign. Bodies can be trained, treated, assisted, accommodated, rested, injured, healed, and altered. Some limits change dramatically; others persist. A life becomes personal through this body not by overcoming the fact of having one, but by learning which demands are real, which interpretations are false or degrading, which supports enlarge participation, and which forms of care are owed.

Yet even the sentence “this body” already requires more than a body. It requires words learned from other people and a history in which those words have acquired force. The inherited life is biological before it is chosen, but it becomes intelligible through language and relationship.

1.3 Language, Family, and Inherited History

No one selects a first language after reviewing the alternatives. Sounds become requests, names, warnings, jokes, categories, and promises through repeated use around a child. By the time the speaker can compare grammars or ask whether a word is adequate, language has already helped divide experience into objects, actions, persons, causes, times, obligations, and emotions.

This inheritance is extraordinary. Language lets absent things be discussed, future actions promised, dead people remain present in stories, and private experience become shareable enough for another person to respond. A life becomes larger because words arrive before the speaker could have invented them.

But language does not arrive empty. A household may use “respect” to mean consideration, obedience, deference to age, protection of dignity, or silence in the face of authority. “Success” may mean security to one generation and independence to another. “Normal” can describe statistical frequency, social approval, bodily expectation, or simply whatever has gone unchallenged for long enough. People can therefore disagree intensely while believing they are arguing about the same word.

Because words are learned inside relationships, changing them can feel like changing the relationship. Rejecting a family description may be heard as rejecting the family; renaming an experience may be accused of rewriting the past. Yet people translate, coin terms, change names, reject degrading labels, and learn distinctions their first vocabulary lacked. Inheritance becomes material for revision.

Family inheritance intensifies this because the first vocabulary arrives with care, authority, dependence, and memory. Family is not one universal structure: continuity may be carried by parents, grandparents, siblings, foster caregivers, extended households, one caregiver, several homes, or institutions. People inherit different mixtures of affection, volatility, silence, absence, and obligation.

A simple sentence can contain the mixture. “We take care of our own” may preserve an extraordinary form of solidarity. People appear without formal appointment, share money, provide rides, care for children, remain through illness, and prevent someone from being abandoned when larger institutions are slow or absent. The sentence can also make outside help shameful, keep danger secret, or assign recurring care to the person least able to refuse. The same inherited meaning can shelter and confine.

Assignments often pass down as descriptions rather than rules. One child becomes “the responsible one,” another “the difficult one.” A phrase that first named a moment hardens into an expected role; later events are interpreted through it. The responsible child is asked first. The difficult child is believed last.

A description can become a rule without anyone remembering that a rule was ever made.

Once conduct can be governed that way, silence can carry the inheritance farther. A name is not spoken, a departure is described only as necessity, or violence survives as warnings without an account of what produced them. The next generation receives a practical conclusion - trust no one, keep money hidden, always obtain credentials - before it receives enough history to judge the conclusion’s scope. Breaking the silence does not guarantee a fair interpretation; it restores the possibility of one.

And a conclusion can outlive the condition that produced it. Collective history enters the household in fragments: migration in a recipe, lost property in a warning about security, earlier exclusion in an insistence on education, political danger in caution around public speech. The original conditions may have changed while the practice remains. What once protected a family can preserve hard-won wisdom and still restrict possibilities earlier generations never had.

That is why inherited meaning rarely presents a clean choice between reverence and rejection. An adult can preserve the refusal to abandon one another while rejecting the silence that prevents competent help. Care can remain a value while its distribution changes. What was once survival can be recognized as too heavy for one person to carry indefinitely. Selective inheritance asks which part of the inheritance deserves continuation, which requires revision, and which should end.

To inherit such a history is not to inherit personal guilt for everything that preceded one’s birth, nor personal merit for every advantage received. It is to enter consequences already distributed. Some doors are easier to open because earlier people built, paid for, defended, or were excluded from them. Some obligations remain legitimate because care created a claim. Others survive because control learned to use the language of gratitude.

The first story in which a life becomes intelligible is never self-authored. Maturity begins when it can be heard as a story: loved without being made infallible, criticized without pretending it never formed the critic, continued in one part and refused in another. But institutions soon give inherited meanings schedules, permissions, duties, categories, and consequences.

1.4 The Organized Life: Roles, Institutions, and Obligations

A school bell does more than make a sound. It divides one child’s day into periods authorized for different activities. A legal age changes what a person may sign, buy, consent to, or refuse. A workweek separates time that belongs to employment from time that ostensibly does not. A profession distinguishes qualified judgment from unverified confidence. A government turns a birth into a recognized record. None of these arrangements waits for the person living inside it to approve its conceptual architecture first.

This is easy to criticize until its achievement is made visible. Organized life allows knowledge, care, protection, transportation, law, sanitation, education, finance, and public infrastructure to continue beyond the memory or goodwill of particular individuals. A hospital can retain specialized capacity no household could reproduce. A legal right can protect a claim when private strength would fail. A school can carry knowledge across generations. Water can arrive because thousands of coordinated acts occur without the recipient personally knowing the people who perform them.

The same achievement requires categories. A person becomes a student, patient, employee, tenant, applicant, taxpayer, passenger, licensed professional, or beneficiary because an arrangement needs to know what access, duty, protection, standard, or decision applies. The category can enable participation. It can also compress the person until the institution begins treating what it needs to know as if it were the whole relevant truth.

This is why a role must remain smaller than the person who carries it. An employee may owe competent work without owing unrestricted availability. A patient may need professional judgment without surrendering experience or refusal. A student may be evaluated without becoming identical to an evaluation. Organized continuity becomes capture when a role expands beyond the purpose and authority that made it legitimate.

The expansion is especially visible in time. Imagine one ordinary afternoon. A meeting ends at four. A child must be collected at four fifteen. An older relative has finally been offered a clinic appointment at four thirty. Public transit connects the three locations in a route planner, but not in a body. Each schedule is intelligible from inside the institution that authored it. Together they ask one person to occupy incompatible places.

Nothing supernatural has happened. No scheduler needed to intend the collision. Each institution authored only part of the day, established which exceptions count, and treated the remainder as someone else’s coordination problem. The person nearest the conflict becomes the apparent owner of a mismatch produced across several arrangements. “Plan better” can sound sensible only by forgetting that the day has several authors.

The collision still has to be resolved somewhere. The meeting may end early, the child may wait, the clinic slot may be lost, or another person may be asked to absorb the problem at short notice. Later, each institution can record only the obligation that was missed, shortened, or rescheduled. The coordination work disappears into the person who carried it.

The mismatch becomes personal where no institution owns it.

The same migration of burden occurs even when no schedule is written. A workplace may have no policy assigning one person to remember birthdays, notice a depleted supply, absorb a late change, or restore calm after conflict. A household may describe care as shared while every interruption migrates toward the person most likely to respond. Repetition gives these expectations force without ever producing a document that can be appealed.

The absence of original consent does not settle whether an obligation is legitimate. Shared goods require contribution. Care can create real claims. A parent may owe a child duties that were never negotiated with the child. A citizen may owe something to public arrangements from which private life continuously benefits. Yet age alone cannot make every inherited demand binding. Some obligations survive because they protect others; some survive because domination has learned to describe itself as tradition.

The practical question must therefore be more discriminating than “Did I choose this?” It asks where the demand came from, whom it protects, what authority supports it, what burden it distributes, who can challenge it, and what happens to others if it is refused. Unchosen does not mean illegitimate. Familiar does not mean legitimate either.

Institutions also distribute the reality of choice. A credential, transit route, immigration rule, work schedule, school boundary, insurance condition, or grant of discretion can make the same stated option practicable for one person and remote for another. Advice addressed to an isolated chooser becomes misleading when the relevant barrier resides in policy, infrastructure, or authority. Motivation cannot repair a rule. Personal efficiency cannot reconcile schedules no one has power to coordinate.

By this point the form at the chapter’s beginning looks less innocent. Its fields do not merely describe a life. They connect the signer to organizations that recognize some facts, ignore others, confer standing, impose duties, and make future actions possible or difficult. But organized life does not operate through rules and categories alone. It becomes durable because human capability is carried into buildings, roads, records, machines, networks, and software. Inheritance is not only biological and social. It is built into the means through which a person can act.

1.5 The Extended Life: Artifacts, Infrastructure, and Technology

An ordinary morning is crowded with abilities no unaided body possesses. A phone wakes a sleeper; glasses alter vision; water crosses buried infrastructure; transit changes the radius of employment; money permits exchange among strangers; a map represents unseen streets; a search service retrieves distant records. Artificial intelligence can compare explanations, translate text, generate alternatives, and work with more representation than unaided memory could hold at once.

An extension is a physical or digital means through which human capability reaches beyond unaided bodily capacity. Clothing changes exposure; books preserve language beyond the speaker; roads stabilize movement; calendars coordinate absent people; software stores and transforms representations. Calling something an extension does not make it a person or give it independent judgment and Responsibility. It identifies a means through which perception, memory, communication, protection, making, movement, or computation has been enlarged.1

The enlargement often works by relocating part of a capability. A route once carried in memory can move into a map. A telephone number can move into a contact list. An institutional procedure can move into a form. A calculation can move into software. This can free attention and improve reliability. It can also create a new vulnerability: when the extension becomes inaccessible, wrong, obsolete, or unintelligible, the person may discover that more than an object has been lost.

The point is not nostalgia for unaided competence. Extension is a major source of human capability. Transportation can make work reachable, translation can permit conversation, libraries can distribute specialized knowledge, and assistive technology can turn exclusion by design into participation. A technical standard can preserve a lesson learned at terrible cost so a stranger need not learn it again personally.

The visible object is only the local edge of a larger dependency. A phone depends on electricity, networks, standards, software, maintenance, manufacturing, law, and distant labor. A vehicle depends on roads, energy, insurance, repair, and rules. A cloud service feels immediate because the infrastructure enabling it has been pushed out of sight. Infrastructure is easiest to notice when it fails.

Artificial intelligence intensifies the pattern because an extension can now operate on language, images, plans, code, and arguments with striking fluency. A person can compare positions, expose assumptions, draft possibilities, summarize records, or test a question from several angles at extraordinary speed. The assistance may genuinely enlarge thought, which makes it tempting to assume capability, authority, and Responsibility have moved together.

They have not. A generated answer does not establish its own accuracy, relevance, fairness, or authority. People still decide what question is asked, which inputs matter, whether the output fits the case, and whether acting on it is permissible. Institutions may define conditions of use; professionals may remain responsible for decisions the model informed. Formidable capability can be carried by an extension without transferring the obligations attached to consequential use.

Artifacts also carry prior decisions more quietly. A staircase assumes a route through a body. A form admits some answers and excludes others. An algorithm operates through categories selected, inherited, or inferred elsewhere. A platform makes one action conspicuous and another hard to find. None of this proves that technology has one fixed social meaning. It shows that design changes what becomes easy, visible, measurable, reversible, and open to challenge.

Access is unequal, and possession is not competence. Unstable internet, obsolete equipment, unavailable assistive technology, or insecure housing can restrict capability through distribution rather than character. Owning the latest tool does not prove the ability to understand, maintain, govern, or safely recover from it. An extension’s presence says little by itself about who can use its capability, who bears its upkeep, or who can intervene when it fails.

The extended life is therefore neither liberation from dependence nor its defeat. Extension rearranges dependence: capability can move outward and become widely available while new points of failure appear. The question now changes. The inherited life is not one solid block. Some of what was given can be changed quickly, some only through other people or institutions, and some scarcely at all. Given and fixed can no longer be treated as the same word.

1.6 What Is Given Is Not Always Fixed

A condition can arrive without choice and still remain alterable. That simple fact separates two questions that are often collapsed. Given asks how a condition entered the relevant life. Fixed asks whether, how much, by whom, and at what cost the condition can now be changed.

A name may be given and later changed. A family description may be inherited and later refused. A first language may remain beloved while another language enlarges what can be said. A body can be trained, treated, assisted, or accommodated. A room can be rearranged. A workplace practice can be negotiated. A law can be challenged. None of these changes proves that the original condition was unreal. Origin does not determine permanence.

Other conditions resist alteration or yield only partially. A person can leave a role and continue living with its history. Medical care can relieve a condition without restoring an earlier body. A border can be crossed while the legal or family consequences remain. Mortality can be delayed and accompanied but not redesigned out of human life. Some injuries can be repaired; others can only be carried differently. Alterability is not a binary switch.

The harder problem is that a condition can be experienced by one person while the power to alter it is distributed elsewhere. Return to the person whose mobility has changed. Furniture inside an apartment may be moved immediately. A portable aid may help at one threshold. The width of a doorway, the building entrance, the elevator, the sidewalk, and the transit stop belong to different material arrangements under different forms of control. The person encounters the barriers as one journey; the authority to change them is divided among a tenant, owner, contractor, municipality, transit agency, and perhaps others.2

This is why “Why don’t you change it?” is often a badly located question. It assumes that the person who bears a condition also controls the level at which the condition is produced. The tenant may understand exactly what would help and still lack money, authority, time, legal protection, or a safe alternative. Formal permission to ask for change may exist while practical refusal threatens housing, income, care, or family stability. Technical possibility can remain practically unavailable to the person most affected by its absence.

Once the level is named, the available action can become more exact. A local rearrangement may provide immediate relief without correcting a building entrance. Negotiation may reach the owner. Collective action or public regulation may alter conditions across many buildings. Different levels can be addressed at once. The person need not choose between pretending that private adaptation solves everything and waiting for total transformation before doing anything.

The distinction also changes how endurance should be interpreted. Remaining inside a condition is not necessarily consent to it. A person may remain because no safe alternative is available, because other people depend on continuity, because exit carries a disproportionate cost, or because the relevant level of intervention lies beyond individual reach. Honest endurance names constraint without converting it into virtue and without accusing the person who cannot escape of having freely selected the condition.

Change needs an equal qualification. The mere ability to alter something does not establish the right to alter it. An intervention may violate another person’s rights, transfer risk, destroy something irreplaceable, or claim authority the changer does not possess. Freedom includes refusal and revision, but it does not make every body, relationship, artifact, workplace, or institution available for private redesign.

Fatalism and the fantasy of reinvention therefore fail for the same reason: both ignore the actual location of change. Fatalism looks at biology, history, or organization and declares the field closed. Reinvention looks at persistence and calls it insufficient courage. The more accurate task is less dramatic and more demanding. Identify the condition. Locate the level at which it is produced. Find who can legitimately act there. Distinguish what can be altered, what requires shared or institutional action, and what for now must be carried.

Once freedom is placed inside this uneven field, it can no longer mean escape from inheritance. It must mean something closer to effective, answerable participation within it. That is why the chapter’s final term becomes necessary: situated Agency.

1.7 Freedom as Situated Agency

A wide menu is not yet freedom. Ten options are useless if none can be understood, afforded, safely chosen, or reached without imposing an unacceptable burden on someone else. A narrow choice can still contain serious freedom when the person understands the situation, possesses a real alternative, and has enough standing to act on it. Counting options confuses visible variety with practical possibility.

The form from the opening makes this visible. A signature beneath incomprehensible terms is formally voluntary and practically thin. So is a consent screen whose refusal disables something unrelated and necessary, or an automated decision with an appeal route no responsible person can explain. The presence of a choice is not the same as Agency.

Agency, as the term is used here, is the practical ability and legitimate authority to act, decide, refuse, challenge, interrupt, delegate, repair, or revise within a stated scope. Because those acts enter a shared world, Agency must remain joined to Responsibility: the person or organized collective exercising authority must still be able to answer for consequential action. Agency is situated because ability, standing, and answerability always exist within bodily, relational, material, institutional, and historical conditions.3

The definition sounds compact only because the chapter has already supplied its parts. A person needs enough intelligibility to recognize what is happening and what claim is being made. A contract that cannot be understood, a medical recommendation whose uncertainty is concealed, or a decision that cannot be explained narrows Agency even when formal permission survives. Information matters only when it becomes usable in relation to the act at hand.

Understanding by itself is still not enough. A real alternative must exist. That alternative may be action, but it may also be delay, appeal, consultation, collective action, request for help, or refusal. A choice printed on a form is not practical freedom when every route except compliance threatens housing, care, income, legal standing, or another unrelated necessity. An alternative must be reachable under conditions in which taking it can matter.

Even a reachable alternative needs effective standing: capability, authority, protection, or support sufficient to act. Dependence can enlarge freedom here. An interpreter can make consent possible; an accessible route can make entry possible; a union, advocate, professional, friend, or public institution can make challenge effective where isolated objection would disappear. Support need not erase authorship when understanding and legitimate responsibility remain with the person acting.

Refusal is one expression of standing, not a magical exemption from relationship. It can protect bodily safety, privacy, dignity, conscience, or a serious obligation. It can also transfer an entire burden onto someone less able to refuse. Situated Agency therefore asks not only whether a person can say no, but what relation the refusal enters, what duty may already exist, and who will carry the consequence.

Agency also changes scale, and the levels are the ones already named: what a person can alter directly, what must be negotiated with another, and what requires collective or public action. Sometimes the most accurate personal act is to preserve an objection, seek allies, or refuse to call a condition legitimate while enduring what cannot yet be changed safely.

Neither extreme named at the opening of this chapter survives here. Most lives occupy uneven fields between them: strong Agency in one setting, weak Agency in another, enlarged by some dependencies, constrained by others, and revised over time.

Agency is not proved by choosing correctly every time. Its quality becomes visible when choice meets resistance: whether objection can be heard, consequences can be noticed, action can be stopped or revised, and responsibility can be located when something goes wrong.

Freedom that authorizes action while shielding the actor from every demand to answer is not Agency enlarged. It is power made unaccountable.

Freedom can therefore grow without the fantasy of independence. It can grow when a condition becomes more legible, an alternative becomes practicable, support becomes trustworthy, a barrier is removed, or authority is moved closer to responsibility. It can also grow when a person recognizes that a desired change belongs at another level and must be pursued with others. That is not defeat; it is a more accurate location of the work.

Return now to the signature. It still comes last. It does not claim authorship of the name, birth, body, language, family history, citizenship, institutions, artifacts, or dependencies recorded above it. It marks something smaller and more serious: a present act made inside conditions the signer did not create.

A life becomes genuinely one’s own in the same way. Not because its materials become private, its dependencies disappear, or its past is replaced, but because more of what has been inherited becomes available for truthful interpretation and responsible response. Some conditions are accepted. Some are revised or refused. Some can be changed only with other people. Some remain beyond present control and must be carried without being mistaken for destiny, consent, or justice.

The life not chosen is therefore not an obstacle standing between a person and the real life. It is the field in which every real act of freedom occurs.

Yet the form has one more lesson. Its fields are not bare facts. A name can carry belonging or shame. A family role can feel like care or confinement. A border can mean safety to one person and exclusion to another. A phone can mean independence until its absence reveals dependence. A door can be wood and metal while also deciding who may enter.

Before a person chooses what to do with the inherited world, that world already means something. The next task is to see how such meanings become embedded in objects, places, categories, and representations - and how much authority they should continue to have.

Notes

  1. Andre Milchman, Triadic Evolution: A Framework for Sociotechnical Species and Civilizational Futures (Independently published, 2026), chaps. 1–2. The present chapter adapts its account of biological life, social organization, and capability-bearing extension to the lived question of how human capability reaches beyond unaided bodily capacity without transferring Judgment or Responsibility to the extension.
  2. N. John Habraken, The Structure of the Ordinary: Form and Control in the Built Environment, ed. Jonathan Teicher (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), and N. John Habraken, “The Uses of Levels,” Open House International 27, no. 2 (2002): 9–20. The present chapter adapts Habraken’s analysis of levels and distributed control to conditions experienced as one practical problem even when authority to change them is divided among several actors.
  3. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). The present account shares the relational-autonomy tradition’s rejection of an isolated chooser while retaining this book’s specific definition of Agency.